Skip to main content

Slack SAML authentication bypass

tl;dr  I found a severe issue in the Slack's SAML implementation that allowed me to bypass the authentication. This has now been solved by Slack.

Introduction

IMHO the rule #1 of any bug hunter (note I do not consider myself one of them since I do this really sporadically) is to have a good RSS feed list.  In the course of the last years I built a pretty decent one and I try to follow other security experts trying to "steal" some useful tricks. There are many experts in different fields of the security panorama and too many to quote them here (maybe another post). But one of the leading expert (that I follow) on SAML is by far Ioannis Kakavas. Indeed he was able in the last years to find serious vulnerability in the SAML implementation of Microsoft and Github. Usually I am more an "OAuth guy" but since both, SAML and OAuth, are nothing else that grandchildren of Kerberos learning SAML has been in my todo list for long time. The Github incident gave me the final motivation to start learning it.

Learning SAML

As said I was a kind of SAML-idiot until begin of 2017 but then I decided to learn it a little bit. Of course I started giving a look the the specification, but the best way I learn things is by doing and hopefully breaking. So I downloaded this great Burp extension called SAML Raider (great stuff, it saves so much time, you can edit any assertion on the fly).
Then I tried to look if any of the service that routinely I use are SAML compliant. It turns out that many of them are. To name some:
  • Github (but I guess Ioannis already took all the bugs there). So ping next (I actually found this funny JS Github bug giving a look into it, but not pertinent here)
  • Hackerone, I gave a try here but nada, nisba, niente, nicht, niet
  • Slack, Bingo see next section (this is probably meant for Enterprise customers)

Slack SAML authentication bypass

As said many of the service I use in my routine are SAML aware so I started to poke a bit them. The vulnerability I found is part of the class known as "confused deputy problem". I already talked about it in one of my OAuth blog post (tl;dr this is also why you never want to use OAuth implicit grant flow as authentication mechanism) and is really simple. Basically SAML assertions, between others contains an element called Audience and AudienceRestriction. Quoting Ioannis:

The Assertion also contains an AudienceRestriction element that defines that this Assertion is targeted for a specific Service Provider and cannot be used for any other Service Provider.
This means that if I present to a ServiceProvider A an assertion meant for ServiceProvider B, then the ServiceProvider A shoud reject it. 
Well between all other things I tried this very really simple attack against a Slack's SAML endpoint /sso/saml and guess what? It worked :o !!
To be more concrete I used an old and expired (yes the assertion was also expired!!) Github's Assertion I had saved somewhere in my archive that was signed for a subject different than mine (namely the username was not asanso aka me) and I presented to Slack. Slack happily accepted it and I was logged in Slack channel with the username of this old and expired Assertion that was never meant to be a Slack one!!! Wow this is scary.... Well well this look bad enough so I stopped quite immediately and open a ticket on Hackerone....

Disclosure timeline 

...here the Slack security team was simply amazing... Thanks guys


02-05-2017 - Reported the issue via Hackerone.
03-05-2017 - Slack confirmed the issue. 
26-08-2017 - Slack awarded a 3000$ bounty but still working with the affected customers in order to solve the vulnerability. Hence the ticket was kept open.
26-10-2017 - Slack closed the issue

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the Slack security team in particular Max Feldman you guys rock, really!!

Well that's all folks. For more SAML trickery follow me on Twitter

Comments

PanickedPacman said…
Your Hackerone anchor tag is missing .com
davide said…
Hi, would you share your RSS list? I'm always interested in reading good stuff ;-)
thanks in advance

Popular posts from this blog

Billion Laugh Attack in https://sites.google.com

tl;dr https://sites.google.com suffered from a Billion Laugh Attack vulnerability that made the containerized environment to crash with a single invocation.
Introduction Few months ago I applied for a talk at a security conference titled Soyouwanna be a Bug Bounty Hunter but it was rejected :(. The reason behind it is that I have been on/off in the bug bounty business for a while as you can see here:
Funny. Found in a forgotten drawer from the time I was a bug hunter :p #facebook#bug#bountypic.twitter.com/Tt4saGZVLI — Antonio Sanso (@asanso) November 30, 2018 and I would have liked to share some of the things I have learned during these years (not necessary technical advises only). You can find a couple of these advises here:


Rule #1 of any bug hunter is to have a good RSS feed list
and here


The rule #2 of any bug hunter is to DO NOT be to fussy with 'food' specifically with "left over"
Today's rule is: The rule #3 of any bug hunter is DO LOOK at the old stuff

and…

OpenSSL Key Recovery Attack on DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)

Usual Mandatory Disclaimer: IANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post...

tl;dr The OpenSSL 1.0.2 releases suffer from a Key Recovery Attack on DH small subgroups. This issue got assigned CVE-2016-0701 with a severity of High and OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f. If an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" or not Lim-Lee (as the one in RFC 5114) and either Static DH ciphersuites are used or DHE ciphersuites with the default OpenSSL configuration (in particular SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set) then is vulnerable to this attack.  It is believed that many popular applications (e.g. Apache mod_ssl) do set the  SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option and would therefore not be at risk (for DHE ciphersuites), they still might be for Static DH ciphersuites.
Introduction So if you are still here it means you wanna know more. And here is the thing. In my last blog post I was …

Top 10 OAuth 2 Implementation Vulnerabilities

Some time ago I posted a blogpost abut  Top 5 OAuth 2 Implementation Vulnerabilities.
This week I have extended the list while presenting Top X OAuth 2 Hacks at OWASP Switzerland.

This blog post (like the presentation) is just a collection of interesting attack OAuth related.

#10 The Postman Always Rings Twice  I have introduced this 'attack' in last year post . This is for provider implementer, it is not extremely severe but, hey, is better to follow the spec. Specifically

The client MUST NOT use the authorization code  more than once.  If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code.

It turned out that even Facebook and Googledid it wrong... :)

#9 Match Point To all OAuth Providers be sure to follow section 4.1.3 of the spec in particular

...if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the initial authorization requ…