tl;dr https://sites.google.com suffered from a Billion Laugh Attack vulnerability that made the containerized environment to crash with a single invocation.
Few months ago I applied for a talk at a security conference titled Soyouwanna be a Bug Bounty Hunter but it was rejected :(. The reason behind it is that I have been on/off in the bug bounty business for a while as you can see here:
Funny. Found in a forgotten drawer from the time I was a bug hunter :p #facebook#bug#bountypic.twitter.com/Tt4saGZVLI
— Antonio Sanso (@asanso) November 30, 2018 and I would have liked to share some of the things I have learned during these years (not necessary technical advises only). You can find a couple of these advises here:
Rule #1 of any bug hunter is to have a good RSS feed list
The rule #2 of any bug hunter is to DO NOT be to fussy with 'food' specifically with "left over" Today's rule is: The rule #3 of any bug hunter is DO LOOK at the old stuff
Usual Mandatory Disclaimer: IANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post...
tl;dr The OpenSSL 1.0.2 releases suffer from a Key Recovery Attack on DH small subgroups. This issue got assigned CVE-2016-0701 with a severity of High and OpenSSL 1.0.2 users should upgrade to 1.0.2f. If an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" or not Lim-Lee (as the one in RFC 5114) and either Static DH ciphersuites are used or DHE ciphersuites with the default OpenSSL configuration (in particular SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set) then is vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications (e.g. Apache mod_ssl) do set the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option and would therefore not be at risk (for DHE ciphersuites), they still might be for Static DH ciphersuites.
So if you are still here it means you wanna know more. And here is the thing. In my last blog post I was …
This blog post (like the presentation) is just a collection of interesting attack OAuth related.
#10 The Postman Always Rings Twice
I have introduced this 'attack' in last year post . This is for provider implementer, it is not extremely severe but, hey, is better to follow the spec. Specifically
client MUST NOT use the authorization code more than once. If an
authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST
deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens
previously issued based on that authorization code.
It turned out that even Facebook and Googledid it wrong... :)