Into the symmetry

tl;dr While the TLS servers attacks has been pretty much studied and fixed (see e.g. https://www.secure-resumption.com/ and https://weakdh.org/ ) the situation with the TLS clients is (was) not ideal and can be improved. Here I report a Small subgroup attack for TLS clients that I performed against various browsers and reported. Whoever reads this blog is used to read about OAuth . For once (and maybe more in the future) let's hijack the usual topic and let's talk about my new "passion" : TLS in particular Diffie–Hellman (DH from now on). Now, before to start I need to clarify one thing IANAC (I am not a cryptographer) so I might likely end up writing a bunch of mistakes in this blog post... Diffie-Hellman is used in SSL/TLS, as "ephemeral Diffie-Hellman" (EDH) and it is probably going to be kill soonish (or at least is the intent of Google Chrome ). FWIW I personally agree with this unless EDH implements the Negotiated Finite Field specification ...

Some time ago I posted a blogpost abut  Top 5 OAuth 2 Implementation Vulnerabilities . This week I have extended the list while presenting Top X OAuth 2 Hacks at OWASP Switzerland. This blog post (like the presentation) is just a collection of interesting attack OAuth related. #10 The Postman Always Rings Twice  I have introduced this 'attack' in last year post . This is for provider implementer , it is not extremely severe but, hey, is better to follow the spec. Specifically The client MUST NOT use the authorization code  more than once.  If an authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on that authorization code. It turned out that even Facebook and Google did it wrong ... :) #9 Match Point To all OAuth Providers be sure to follow section 4.1.3 of the spec in particular ...if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the...

tl;dr in this blog post we are going to give a look at modern browsers's protection with some hands on example available at https://github.com/asanso/browsers-security and deployed in Heroku . This blog post is NOT about Same-origin policy Introduction In this blog post we are going to give a look at modern browsers's protection. More specifically if you are designing a REST API where the result response is driven by some user input, then why not have some help from the browser rather than brewing some ad hoc protection? I am going to provide some demo deployed in Heroku . If you prefer running them on your machine you might want to clone  https://github.com/asanso/browsers-security and drill down into the specific example. Mind your content type By definition Content-Type entity-header field indicates the media type of the entity-body sent to the recipient or, in the case of the HEAD method, the media type that would have been sent had the request b...