Into the symmetry

tl;dr  I found a severe issue in the Slack 's SAML implementation that allowed me to bypass the authentication. This has now been solved by Slack. Introduction IMHO the rule #1 of any bug hunter (note I do not consider myself one of them since I do this really sporadically) is to have a good RSS feed list.  In the course of the last years I built a pretty decent one and I try to follow other security experts trying to "steal" some useful tricks. There are many experts in different fields of the security panorama and too many to quote them here (maybe another post). But one of the leading expert (that I follow) on SAML is by far Ioannis Kakavas . Indeed he was able in the last years to find serious vulnerability in the SAML implementation of Microsoft and Github . Usually I am more an "OAuth guy" but since both, SAML and OAuth, are nothing else that grandchildren of Kerberos learning SAML has been in my todo list for long time. The Github incident gave me

The article was modified since its publication. Last update was 09/10/2017  See  also Part II and Part III of this series tl;dr in this post we are going to describe how to try predict the output of Micali-Schnorr Generator (MS-DRBG)  knowing the factorization of the n  value. If this sounds like, "why the hell should I care?" , you might want to give a look at this great post from Matthew Green about the backdoor in Dual_EC_DRBG . But In a nutshell, quoting Matthew Green : Dual_EC_DRBG is not the only asymmetric random number generator in the ANSI and ISO standards (see at the bottom).   it’s not obvious from the public literature how one would attack the generator even if one knew the factorization of the n  values above. What I am NOT claiming in this post though is that there is a backdoor in one of this standard. Introduction The first time I heard about this problem is about couple of weeks ago via this Matthew's tweet: As a curiosity,